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Keeping the Internet Neutral?: Tim
Wu and Christopher Yoo Debate
Tim Wu is Professor of Law at the Columbia Law School. He is the
author of Network Neutrality, Broadband Discrimination (2003) and
coauthor, with Jack Goldsmith, of Who Controls the Internet? (Oxford
University Press 2006). Christopher S. Yoo is Professor of Law and
Director of the Technology and Entertainment Law Program at the
Vanderbilt University Law School. He is the author of Beyond Network
Neutrality (2005) and Network Neutrality and the Economics of Congestion
(2006) and the coauthor, with Daniel F. Spulber, of the forthcoming
Networks in Telecommunications: Economics and Law (Cambridge
University Press).
Yoo:
During the past year, network neutrality emerged as one of the most
controversial issues in Internet policy. Although the details of specific
proposals differ, as a general matter, a network neutrality mandate would
prohibit network owners from discriminating against particular applications
and content providers. Network neutrality played a key role in the debates
over communications reform legislation that was pending before the Senate
and the House of Representatives, as well as in the Federal
Communications Commission’s (“FCC”) clearance of the SBC-AT&T,
Verizon-MCI, and AT&T-BellSouth mergers.1
I am not convinced that deviations from network neutrality will
necessarily harm consumers and innovation. On the contrary, competition
and innovation might be better served if policymakers embraced a
1. On the role that network neutrality played in congressional debates and the SBCAT&T and Verizon-MCI mergers, see Christopher S. Yoo, Network Neutrality and the
Economics of Congestion, 94 GEO. L.J. 1847, 1859–60 (2006) [hereinafter Economics of
Congestion]. On the AT&T-BellSouth merger, see AT&T Inc. and BellSouth Corporation
Application for Transfer of Control, News Release, WC Docket No. 06-74 (Dec. 29, 2006)
(merger conditions available at http://hraunfoss.fcc.gov/edocs_public/attachmatch/DOC269275A1.pdf).
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“network diversity” principle that would allow different network owners to
pursue different approaches to routing traffic.
Simply put, deviations from network neutrality may represent nothing
more than network owners’ attempts to satisfy the increasingly intense and
heterogeneous demands imposed by end-users.2 The early Internet was
dominated by applications such as email and Web browsing, in which
delays of half a second were virtually unnoticeable. These are being
replaced by newer applications, such as Internet telephony and streaming
video, in which such delays can be catastrophic. One obvious solution
would be to give a higher priority to traffic associated with time-sensitive
applications. Unfortunately, this is precisely the type of discrimination
3
between applications that network neutrality would condemn.
Another interesting innovation is the emergence of content-delivery
networks like Akamai, which reportedly serves 15% of the world’s Web
traffic. Suppose that an end-user in Los Angeles attempted to download a
Web page from CNN.com. If CNN.com hosted the content itself, this
request would have to travel thousands of miles to the server in CNN’s
headquarters in Atlanta and back, passing any number of points of
congestion along the way. The speed with which the request is filled also
depends on the number of other queries being directed at CNN’s server.
Akamai minimizes delay by caching content at thousands of locations
throughout the Internet and routing requests to the server that is the closest
and/or the least congested. The catch from the standpoint of network
neutrality is that Akamai is a commercial enterprise, which means that
those who are willing to pay more get faster service.4
Employing different protocols might also provide more competition
among network platforms by permitting multiple networks to survive by
targeting subsegments of the overall market, in much the same way that
specialty stores survive in a world dominated by low-cost, mass-market
retailers (or, more properly, given the scale necessary for a
telecommunications network to be viable, in the same way that department
stores compete by developing strengths in certain types of merchandise and
becoming the exclusive distribution outlet for particular product lines). For
example, deviating from network neutrality might make it possible for
three last-mile networks to coexist: one optimized for traditional Internet
applications, such as email and Web site access; a second incorporating
2. See Christopher S. Yoo, Would Mandating Network Neutrality Help or Hurt
Broadband Competition?: A Comment on the End-to-End Debate, 3 J. ON TELECOMM. &
HIGH TECH. L. 23, 34–37 (2004).
3. Christopher S. Yoo, Beyond Network Neutrality, 19 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 1, 20–25
(2005) [hereinafter Beyond Network Neutrality].
4. See Economics of Congestion, supra note 1, at 1881–82.

Number 3]

KEEPING THE INTERNET NEUTRAL?

577

security features to facilitate e-commerce; and a third that facilitates timesensitive applications such as streaming media and Internet telephony.
Network neutrality, in contrast, threatens to foreclose this outcome and
instead forces networks to compete solely on price and network size—
considerations that favor the largest players.5
At this point, it is impossible to foresee which architecture will
ultimately represent the best approach. When it is impossible to tell
whether a practice would promote or hinder competition, the accepted
policy response is to permit the practice to go forward until actual harm to
consumers can be proven. This restraint provides the room for
experimentation upon which normal competitive processes depend. It also
shows appropriate humility about our ability to predict the technological
future.6
Wu:
Network neutrality is a useful way of talking about discrimination
policies, on networks or otherwise. Whether it comes to employment,
networks, or just about anything else, no one really believes in systems that
ban discrimination completely. In employment, for example, you want to
be able to fire people who are lousy—to discriminate on the basis of
ability. When government chooses who gets to vote, we accept that it can
say “no” to twelve-year-olds.
Yet I don’t think that the fact that an absolute ban on discrimination
would be ridiculous undermines the case for discrimination laws. It’s like
what nutritionists say about fat: there are good and bad types. And what I
think is going on in the network neutrality debate—the useful part of it—is
getting a better grip on what amounts to good and bad forms of
discrimination on information networks.
Christopher, you’ve done a good job of suggesting some of the
reasons that types of discrimination can be useful on a network, like
dealing with congestion problems and offering different types of networks
altogether. These are valid points. But sometimes you seem to be arguing
that based on a few good examples of discrimination, that there’s no such
thing as bad discrimination—particularly where a network gatekeeper has
market power. That is where we part company.
I’ll start with the clearest network example: blocking. So yes, in
general, a Bell or cable company has some interest in giving you as broadly
useful a network as possible, because then the product is more valuable,
and the company can charge more for it. But that interest in neutrality holds
5. See Beyond Network Neutrality, supra note 3, at 27–37.
6. See id. at 6–7, 75.
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true only to a point. If a product being offered over the network—say,
Internet voice (“VoIP”) for $5 a month—competes with an established
revenue source (telephone service, offered at $30 a month), the temptation
to block it is strong. It is true that, in theory, the provider might start
charging the customer $25 a month extra because the network is now more
valuable. But that means taking on the costs of changing business models
and establishing new consumer pricing patterns, which companies are loath
to do.
I am not sure if you would go so far to suggest that blocking is fine
because either companies won’t do it or will have good reasons when they
do. As to whether they will, we don’t have to make guesses, because
incumbent providers in the United States and in many countries around the
world, including Mexico, have blocked or wanted to block competition
from VoIP. The United States Trade Representative’s office has an ongoing
practice, in fact, of trying to talk to countries and their incumbents about
such blocking. They don’t call it network neutrality or anything of the sort,
but it is the export of network neutrality policies.
What’s bad about blocking, then? At an extreme, blocking can keep a
better or cheaper product (VoIP) from coming to market at all, and often it
can prevent such products from being offered in an effective form. That’s a
problem, in turn, because if you believe that market entry and innovation
are linked to economic growth, we’re ultimately talking about such policies
hindering the growth rate of the country.
Now I admit blocking is the clearest case where discrimination is bad,
and it provides the strongest justification for network neutrality rules.
That’s what Michael Powell thought too, and that’s why he announced
such blocking would be illegal.7 But I also think there’s another type of bad
discrimination—picking favorites, or choosing one company out of many
to favor. I’ll explain why in the next post, but I better let you back on to see
what you have to say.
Yoo:
To date, the debate has focused primarily on a type of discrimination
known as “access tiering,” in which network owners charge Web sites and
application providers more for premium (i.e., higher speed) service. Access
tiering could provide benefits similar to those provided by the emergence
of premium mail services like FedEx. Instead of taking three to four days to
send a letter from coast to coast, FedEx made it possible to send the same
letter overnight. FedEx customers were more than happy to pay more for
7. Ben Charny, Mexico Telephone Operator Under VoIP Fire, CNETNEWS.COM, Apr.
25, 2005 (describing USTR comments), available at http://news.com.com/Mexico+telephon
e+operator+under+VoIP+fire/2100-7352_3-5681542.html.
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faster service, since it opened up new ways of doing business that were
impossible when everyone paid the same amount for a single class of
service.
The same logic applies to the Internet. The Internet is currently
dominated by a suite of protocols known as TCP/IP (Transmission Control
Protocol/Internet Protocol). TCP/IP has two notable features: first, it routes
traffic on a “first come, first served” basis, which provides no guarantees as
to how quickly a packet will arrive; second, it also routes traffic on a “best
efforts” basis, which provides no guarantees that a packet will ever be
delivered. Companies developing applications that depend on guaranteed
throughput rates (e.g., 100 Mbps) have indicated that they would willingly
pay more to ensure better quality service. This has led leading technologists
to point out that TCP/IP is a thirty-year-old technology and that network
owners should be permitted to experiment with new capabilities.8
So what is the proper policy response if access tiering would
sometimes be beneficial and sometimes not? Fortunately, the Supreme
Court’s antitrust jurisprudence offers useful guidance. These precedents
establish a presumption in favor of the rule of reason, which evaluates
competitive harms on a case-by-case basis.9 Practices that evince such a
“pernicious effect on competition and lack of any redeeming virtue” that
they can be “conclusively presumed to be unreasonable and therefore
illegal without elaborate inquiry as to the precise harm they have caused or
the business excuse for their use” are declared to be illegal per se and are
categorically prohibited.10 Conversely, there is a strong argument in favor
of treating practices that are almost never harmful as legal per se.11 In the
absence of a “demonstrable economic effect,” practices should not be
12
categorically prohibited. Practices that are sometimes harmful and
sometimes beneficial are subject to the rule of reason, which permits them
to go forward until those challenging them can demonstrate a concrete
harm to competition.13 Supreme Court precedent would thus contradict
regulations that would make ambiguous practices like access tiering
8. See Andrew Orlowski, Father of Internet Warns Against Net Neutrality, THE
REGISTER, Jan. 18, 2007, http://www.theregister.co.uk/2007/01/18/ kahn_net_ neutrality_
warning/ (quoting speech by co-developer of TCP/IP Robert Kahn and noting that with the
exception of Vint Cerf, who now serves as a policy advocate for Google, “most of the senior
engineers responsible for developing the packet switched internetworking of today oppose
‘Neutrality’ legislation.”).
9. See Bus. Elecs. Corp. v. Sharp Elecs. Corp., 485 U.S. 717, 726 (1988).
10. See, e.g., N. Pac. Ry. Co. v. United States, 356 U.S. 1, 5 (1957).
11. See Richard A. Posner, The Next Step in the Antitrust Treatment of Restricted
Distribution: Per Se Legality, 48 U. CHI. L. REV. 6, 23–26 (1981).
12. Bus. Elecs., 485 U.S. at 726.
13. Id.
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categorically illegal. Instead, it would seem to favor taking a middle
course—like my “network diversity” proposal—that would allow networks
to experiment with different approaches unless and until they are shown to
14
harm competition.
Even Web site or port blocking may not be as problematic as may
appear at first glance. One of the central insights of competition policy is
that network owners have powerful incentives to maximize the value of
applications and content delivered through their networks.15 As suggested
in my earlier post, exclusivity can provide a form of differentiation that can
increase the number of providers who can survive. For example, DirecTV’s
exclusive access to the “NFL Sunday Ticket” package has enhanced its
16
ability to compete with cable, and DirecTV recently struck a similar deal
for Major League Baseball’s “Extra Innings” package. The partnership
between Yahoo! and SBC’s (now AT&T’s) DSL service and Disney’s and
ESPN’s recent efforts to offer mobile phones that give preferential access
to certain types of content may represent attempts to pursue a similar
strategy.17 And if a wireless broadband or broadband over powerline
(“BPL”) provider were to emerge so that consumers have at least three lastmile broadband options (including cable modem and DSL), there would be
little danger in allowing one of those networks to experiment with
exclusivity arrangements. The experimenting network might find a new
business model that would deliver greater value to consumers. If not, then
we would expect competitors to steal business from the experimenting
network until it reversed course.
In any event, the possibility of anticompetitive blocking would not
14. See Beyond Network Neutrality, supra note 3, at 75. Interestingly, the speech in
which Michael Powell announced his four Internet freedoms is often misconstrued as an
endorsement of network neutrality regulation. See Michael K. Powell, Preserving Internet
Freedom: Guiding Principles for the Industry, 3 J. ON TELECOMM. & HIGH TECH. L. 5, 11–
12 (2004). Powell made clear at the time that he thought that the evidence did not justify
mandating network neutrality and that his words were offered simply as a statement of a set
of best practices to which he thought the industry should adhere. Id. at 10. Powell has
subsequently reemphasized the same point. See Economics of Congestion, supra note 1, at
1857.
15. See Christopher S. Yoo, Vertical Integration and Media Regulation in the New
Economy, 19 YALE J. ON REG. 171, 187–202, 253–67 (2002) [hereinafter Vertical
Integration]; accord Joseph Farrell & Philip J. Weiser, Modularity, Vertical Integration,
and Open Access Policies: Towards a Convergence of Antitrust and Regulation in the
Internet Age, 17 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 85, 104 (2003) (noting that “the platform monopolist
has an incentive to be a good steward of the applications sector for its platform”); James B.
Speta, Handicapping the Race for the Last Mile?: A Critique of Open Access Rules for
Broadband Platforms, 17 YALE J. ON REG. 39, 76 (2000) (noting that network owners have
strong incentives to maximize the value of complementary services).
16. See Beyond Network Neutrality, supra note 3, at 32.
17. See Economics of Congestion, supra note 1, at 1895.
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support the type of general nondiscrimination mandate favored by network
neutrality proponents. The only time that network owners have a plausible
incentive to block a Web site is when they sponsor Web sites that compete
directly with the blocked site. Conversely, network owners that do not
operate auction sites have no incentive to block eBay, since doing so would
simply lower the value of their network (and thus lower the amount that
they can charge for it) without providing any compensating benefits.
Similarly, while DSL providers may have some incentive to block VoIP,
they have no plausible incentive to block services like streaming video that
they do not currently offer. At most, concerns about blocking would thus
support limited regulatory intervention that would only prohibit vertically
integrated network owners from blocking content and applications that
competed directly with their own offerings. It would not justify broad
restrictions on discrimination of the kind being proposed (and currently
being rejected) in Congress.18
Wu:
A lot of the difference between Christopher’s view and my own stems
from how we think the process of innovation occurs. Christopher, rather
like Joseph Schumpeter in his later years, believes that large firms—in this
case, network operators—drive telecommunications innovation. As
Schumpeter then put it, the ‘‘large-scale establishment’’ is ‘‘the most
powerful engine of progress and in particular of the long-run expansion of
total output.’’19
Christopher thinks incumbents like AT&T will rarely or perhaps
never threaten innovation. Instead he views them as the driving force of the
technologies of tomorrow.
I am skeptical. I think this view of incumbent behavior has been
discredited, and that in general, incumbents, particularly in a monopoly
position, have a strong incentive to block market entry and innovative
technologies that threaten their existing business model.
My faith is that economic growth is driven by market entry, and I
believe that when it’s careful, government can play an important role in
controlling barriers to market entry that incumbents might impose. That’s
not to say it is easy—the challenge is to bar the worst abuses without
destroying an incentive to become an incumbent in the first place.
Government often gets it wrong. But Christopher’s views tend toward
assuming the problem away, through what I view as unrealistic
assumptions about incumbent behavior.
18. See id. at 1899–900.
19. See JOSEPH SCHUMPETER, CAPITALISM, SOCIALISM & DEMOCRACY 106 (1957).
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The growth of the many industries on top of the Internet is a powerful
testament to the vision I’ve described. For the Internet’s design itself, and
then successive FCC rules (like the famous Computer Inquiries rules)
managed to prevent infrastructure incumbents from having any influence
on market entry. My stake, stated otherwise, is with the younger
Schumpeter, who studied entrepreneurs, unusual individuals with ‘‘the
dream or will to found a private kingdom,’’ ‘‘the will to conquer: the
impulse to fight, to prove oneself superior to others,’’ and finally the ‘‘joy
20
of creating.’’
But let’s turn away from theory to the practical matter Christopher
brought up: what he calls access tiering—or giving preferential treatment
over the last mile.
In my view, there are several problematic sides to access tiering. You
have, say, AT&T with a monopoly over broadband in a given area. AT&T
makes an exclusive deal with Yahoo! to provide preferred searches on
AT&T’s network. As a consequence, the Yahoo! engine loads faster than
any of its competitors. I’ve said elsewhere it might be as if your electric
company was to make a deal with Samsung so that your refrigerators from
General Electric would no longer work quite so well. That’s the problem
I’m discussing.
There’s a word for this: it’s a form of discrimination called Most
Favored Nation (“MFN”) discrimination—different treatment of like,
competing products. And the problem, of course, is a distortion of
competition. In our search example, the best product doesn’t win, but rather
the product with the best connection to AT&T, and the one that poses no
threat to any of AT&T’s business models.
Second, access tiering is another word for charging companies a
termination fee—a fee to reach customers of the service provider in
question. While Christopher and others suggest that access tiering will lead
to more innovation in the last mile, the opposite can be true. If you can
generate revenue by charging content provider to reach customers, as
opposed to charging for bandwidth, something happens. The incentives
become mixed, as the provider gains an incentive to maintain a level of
scarcity, and thereby maximize gatekeeper revenue. So I don’t agree with
Christopher that access fees will necessarily spark more last-mile
innovation.
All this returns me to the earlier discussion of innovation. The risk, as
I’ve said elsewhere, is a market where several large companies set the pace
of innovation, not the challenges of competitors. But historically—and by
current economic theory—the many beat out the few. I’ll take the track
20. JOSEPH A. SCHUMPETER, A THEORY OF ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT 93 (Harvard Univ.
1961).
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record of decentralized innovation.
Yoo:
The Schumpeterian thesis (that large firms are more innovative) has
21
spawned a huge empirical literature that is largely inconclusive. AT&T
provides an excellent example. On the one hand, the Bell System created a
telephone network that was the envy of the world and pioneered Nobel
Prize-winning breakthroughs such as the transistor. On the other hand, it
was extremely slow to deploy innovative technologies like DSL.
Furthermore, Schumpeterian competition is founded on the idea that
horizontal competition within a market among similarly situated players
offering similar products to the same customers would be replaced by
competition between a succession of monopolists for the market.
Interestingly, network diversity would provide a way for multiple players
to survive and prevent the market from collapsing into Schumpeterian
competition in the first place.22
But the Schumpeterian thesis is not central to the debate over network
neutrality. As Tim has recognized in his earlier work, network neutrality is
really about vertical integration between content and conduit.23 Over the
past few decades, vertical integration theory has undergone a sea change.24
Until the 1970s, economic theory and the Supreme Court’s antitrust
jurisprudence were quite hostile toward vertical integration. Instead, they
fostered a world in which manufacturers were free to mix and match with
different retailers and distributors as they saw fit.
Over time, both academia and the courts began to realize that vertical
integration simply represents a different way to organize an industry that
can often yield substantial benefits. To cite one concrete example, the
central goal of the breakup of AT&T was to enable consumers to choose
their long-distance provider.25 In today’s world, wireless customers cannot
choose their long-distance provider, and yet that fact has not prevented the
wireless market from being extremely competitive. The key difference is
that during the breakup of AT&T, there was only one local service option.
In today’s world, there are more, and the competition among them keeps
everyone honest.
Competition policy thus teaches us that any vertical chain of
21. See Vertical Integration, supra note 15, at 276–77.
22. See Beyond Network Neutrality, supra note 3, at 58–60.
23. See Tim Wu, The Broadband Debate, A User’s Guide, 3 J. ON TELECOMM. & HIGH
TECH. L. 69, 84–85 (2004).
24. See Economics of Congestion, supra note 1, at 1885–87; Vertical Integration, supra
note 155, at 186–202.
25. See Beyond Network Neutrality, supra note 3, at 17–18.
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production will only be as efficient as its least competitive link. The proper
focus of broadband policy is to identify the level of production that is the
most concentrated and the most protected by entry barriers and to try to
make it more competitive. This suggests that the current debate is focusing
on the wrong policy problem. Network neutrality proposals are aimed at
preserving competition in applications and content, which are those
portions of the industry that are already the most competitive and the least
protected by entry barriers (and thus the most likely to remain that way).
Instead, the real focus should be on the impact network neutrality
26
regulation would have on the competitiveness of the last-mile.
The last twelve months demonstrate how imposing network neutrality
threatens to reduce investment in new last-mile technologies. After the
Supreme Court’s June 2005 Brand X decision made clear that content and
applications providers could no longer count on regulation to guarantee
access to cable modem and DSL systems,27 companies such as Google,
Microsoft, Earthlink, and Intel began pouring money into wireless
broadband and broadband over powerline (“BPL”), demonstrated most
dramatically by Google’s agreement to build a wireless broadband network
in San Francisco for free.28 These were not acts of corporate charity. The
threat of being cut off from the existing networks was what spurred these
companies into investing in new ones.
I also do not think that Most Favored Nation nondiscrimination will
be as easy to implement as Tim suggests. The Supreme Court’s Trinko
decision recognized that the complexity of the interface between
telecommunications providers creates myriad nonprice-related dimensions
along which the quality of interconnection can vary.29 Mandating
nondiscrimination would thus require policing a large swath of the business
relationship between a party seeking access and a network that would not
be doing business with it absent regulation. Furthermore, large, established
players have more resources and experience with which to influence the
regulatory process.30
Competition in the last mile can achieve the same benefits while
avoiding the problems associated with regulation. Once a sufficient number
of last-mile options exists, it would matter little if one network chose to
make Yahoo! its preferred search engine. As I noted earlier, exclusivity can
26. See Beyond Network Neutrality, supra note 3, at 15–18.
27. Nat’l Cable & Telecomm. Ass’n v. Brand X Internet Servs., 545 U.S. 967 (2005).
28. See Economics of Congestion, supra note 1, 1894–95.
29. Verizon Commc’ns Inc. v. Law Offices of Curtis V. Trinko, LLP, 540 U.S. 398,
414–15 (2004).
30. See Beyond Network Neutrality, supra note 3, at 37–45, 67–68; Economics of
Congestion, supra note 1, at 1896–97.
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promote competition by allowing networks to compete on dimensions aside
from price and network size (considerations that inherently favor the
largest players). If such exclusivity proves to be uneconomic, the network
will lose customers until it returns to nonexclusivity.
So I agree with Tim that we should place our faith in market entry.
Where we differ is that I would focus on entry into the last mile, not entry
into content and applications. And economic theory and Supreme Court
precedent have both recognized that mandating access would increase lastmile concentration by reducing incentives to invest in new transmission
technologies.31
Wu:
Christopher brings up the economics of the last mile, which are worth
talking about, and to my mind, unendingly interesting. They are a shortcut
for talking about the economics of infrastructure, which is really the center
of this debate.
So the classic challenge with infrastructure projects like the last mile
is this: there are high upfront costs to build the infrastructure, and low
“marginal” or incremental costs of running the infrastructure. If we’re
talking about roads, for example, it costs a lot to build a road, but the cost
of handling each additional car on the road is low (nearly nothing).
Those economics have a tendency to make market entry challenging.
That’s why some (though this is disputed) suggest that infrastructure like
plumbing, electricity, or telecom service is by its nature a “natural
monopoly.”
Whether that is true is a big debate that I don’t want to get into. It is
worth saying that the label “natural monopoly” has sometimes been used to
justify too much regulation. But let’s look at the telecom situation.
In telecom, the high upfront costs have sometimes but not always
scared off private investments. They haven’t scared off investment when
the market entrant is offering a new and compelling service, like cable
television in the 1970s, or at one point, telephone service between the
1890s and the 1920s. But when there’s an incumbent in place, either its
presence, or misguided regulation like franchising requirements, seems to
have deterred market entry.
Internet access is a good example. There is vigorous market entry, as
Christopher noted, at virtually every part of the Internet-affiliated
economy—including, at the infrastructure layer, the national backbone. But
the exception to this rule is the last mile. Today, despite much hope and
31. See Trinko, 540 U.S. at 407–08, 414; Beyond Network Neutrality, supra note 3, at
48–53.
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talk over the last decade, there hasn’t been a successful widespread
deployment of a third pipe to the home (including wireless). Sprint, for a
while, offered a fixed wireless service. Some areas, usually rural, use
satellite services. Broadband over powerlines is still talked about now and
then, but truly mass deployments, according to the FCC’s numbers, do not
32
exist.
The basic story, for most of the country’s businesses, is a monopoly,
and for homes, a duopoly of cable and Bell.
So if we want to encourage the deployment of last-mile infrastructure,
what to do? There are a number of classic solutions to the infrastructure
problem, and I’ll discuss three.
1. One is for government to spend money and build the infrastructure
itself. That’s what the United States does for roads, and what many Asian
countries have been doing with the Internet and broadband. Their theory is
that the purpose of government is to invest in national infrastructure, and
they see investing in Internet infrastructure as a part of that.
In fact, I remember meeting with a Chinese Internet policy advisor to
President Hu Jintao, and he asked me how much the U.S. federal
government spends on building networks. I said, other than some funding
for schools, and investments in research, very little. Astounded, he asked,
“But what about the Internet?” That was research, I said.
Today’s municipal broadband networks are an example of a local
version of the same policy. They are efforts by the government to build
infrastructure it doesn’t think will be built by the private sector.
I don’t want to say there aren’t problems with these kinds of
approaches. Pork projects are a predictable consequence—railways to
nowhere, and so on. There are also good odds that the wrong thing will be
built—roads when we need railways, or vice versa. But anyhow, it’s one
approach, and one this country and others have used frequently over
history.
2. A similar solution is to subsidize buildouts, one way or another.
We can find this in another major part of U.S. infrastructure policy: the
mortgage deduction. The result of the mortgage deduction is that
developers build far more homes and buildings than they would otherwise.
It is a straightforward incentive to build. Such incentives might be
considered for broadband.
In telecom policy, telephone companies already take major
depreciation deductions, but it might be possible for the tax code to do
more to encourage deployments of information networks. There are, of
32. FCC, WIRELINE COMPETITION BUREAU, HIGH-SPEED SERVICES FOR INTERNET
ACCESS: STATUS AS OF JUNE 30, 2006, at 5, tbl. 1 (2007).
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course, problems with this approach too, like getting the tax deduction
wrong in one of a million ways.
3. Do nothing. Doing nothing isn’t a bad approach, necessarily. It
presumes that in some way or another, either the market or new
technologies will overcome the infrastructure economics problem. It is true,
for example, that the lure of offering TV service and capturing some of
cable’s market share seems to be what is pulling Verizon and AT&T into
deploying fiber optic cable in some areas. Doing nothing is also a bet that
new technologies might arrive (or have arrived) that overcome the
problems of last-mile economics—such as the hope that eventually wireless
technologies of some kind will solve the last-mile solution. If you don’t
think broadband infrastructure is not worth subsidizing, and if what you
fear most is the risk of government wasting too much money on
infrastructure, doing nothing is has its merits.
The downside with doing nothing is the possibility that nothing will
happen. It is possible that, under a do-nothing approach, today’s duopoly
will simply persist, and build out higher speed networks with all deliberate
speed, which is to say, slowly. Stated differently, Christopher may be
wrong about how much technological developments have really changed
the economics of the last mile. From my time in industry, I’m frankly a
little skeptical of the view that today’s last-mile is truly a contestable
market, but I’d love to be proved wrong.
All of these options have their attractions and problems. But to my
mind, given the fundamental nature of the problem, the issue of network
neutrality is really quite beside the point. The problems of infrastructure
economics are real and cannot be ignored. But the connection between
these points and allowing last-mile providers to run discriminatory
networks seems to me tangential at best.
Arguably, as a “solution” to the last-mile problem, allowing
discrimination is both costly and ineffective. Its costs are large potential
costs to the application market. And the idea that it will somehow solve the
economic problems of the last mile strikes me as unlikely at best. So you
risk the health of the applications market, and really, all for what?
Yoo:
I agree that the high fixed costs have long represented one of the
defining features of the telecommunications industry and the touchstone of
all telecommunications policy. For decades, the conventional wisdom
accepted that local telecommunications networks were natural monopolies
and that competition among multiple last-mile networks was infeasible.
Thus, even though concentration in the last mile represented the central
issue in telecommunications policy, it was presumed that any attempt to
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increase the competitiveness of the last mile would ultimately prove futile.
As a result, policymakers focused on the second-best goal of promoting
33
competition in complementary services. It was during this period that the
FCC instituted the prior access regulations that Tim usually invokes as
precedents for network neutrality.34
The economics of the last mile have changed radically in recent years.
The fixed costs of establishing last-mile networks have dropped through
the floor. Switching equipment that used to take up an entire building can
now be housed in a box roughly the size of a personal computer. Copper
wires have been replaced by a series of innovations, including terrestrial
microwave, satellites, and fiber optics, which have greatly reduced the
costs of transmission.
The emergence of spectrum-based transmission is important for
another reason. It renders telecommunications markets “contestable.”
Contestability theory has pointed out that high fixed costs need not
represent an entry barrier if new entrants can recoup most of those costs by
reselling them to someone else should they have to exit. Although the
resale market for the wires of a failed telecommunications network has
historically been rather limited, the same is not true for spectrum. The
greater number of ways that spectrum can be used renders the market for
35
redeploying spectrum considerably more vibrant.
Demand-side forces are also rendering competition in the last mile
increasingly feasible. Many markets involve fixed costs; it is only when the
fixed costs are large relative to the market as a whole that they become
problematic. The pressure toward natural monopoly can thus also be
alleviated by increases in demand as well as by reductions in fixed cost. Put
a different way, if a network generates more value per customer, the size of
the customer base that a network owner needs to survive shrinks, and the
number of networks that can exist in equilibrium increases.
The development of the Internet has greatly increased the value of the
services that can be provided by last-mile networks. The rollout of
convergent technologies, such as Internet telephony and packet video, will
break down the barriers that previously limited the revenues generated by
any particular transmission technology. Cable is already able to provide
voice through its coaxial network, and it is just a matter of time before
telephone companies are able to provide video. Application-based
distinctions between transmission media will completely collapse once all
applications become packetized. At that point, all applications will simply
be packets riding on a data pipe, and the functional distinctions between
33. See Economics of Congestion, supra note 1, at 1878–79, 1894–95.
34. See, e.g., Wu, supra note 23, at 88–89.
35. See Beyond Network Neutrality, supra note 3, at 27, n.92.
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transmission media that have long lain at the heart of telecommunications
policy will become irrelevant.36
Now that competition in the last mile is feasible, the focus should
shift away from the second-best policy goal of promoting competition in
complementary services and return to the first-best policy goal of
promoting competition in the last mile. As I have noted before, this shift in
focus arguably favors abandoning access regulations like network
neutrality. Not only are access regulations extremely difficult to implement,
they can deter investment in new last-mile networks, since content and
applications providers who are guaranteed access to the existing network
37
have no incentive to invest in new ones. In other words, access regulation
threatens to deprive would-be builders of alternative network capacity of
their natural strategic partners. In the process, access regulation could well
have the perverse effect of cementing the existing last-mile oligopoly into
place.
Although government construction of last-mile networks is a
plausible alternative, global history counsels against such a course. The
U.S. is singular in its embrace of private ownership of the core
telecommunications network. In the vast majority of other countries,
telecommunications networks were government-created and -owned. The
poor service quality, long waiting lists for installation, and slow
deployment of new technologies in Britain and other government-owned
telecommunications systems are legendary. The most eloquent proof is that
essentially all of those countries are either in the process of privatizing their
telecommunications networks or have already done so. Waiting for these
new last-mile networks to emerge can be frustrating, and the lack of lastmile options may cause content and applications providers difficulty in the
meantime. Before jumping in and regulating, policymakers should remind
themselves of the inherent tendency to overvalue immediate harms and to
undervalue future benefits, because the former seem so concrete and the
latter so contingent. The problem is that in many (if not most) cases,
compounding causes the long-term benefits to dominate the short-term
losses. Placing too great an emphasis on the pressing needs of the here and
now could foreclose these larger, longer-term benefits from ever being
realized.38
At the end of the day, a large part of the network neutrality debate can
be viewed as nothing more than an intramural fight between the large
content providers (like Google) and the large network providers (like
Verizon and Comcast). The market power that last-mile providers possess
36. See Vertical Integration, supra note 15, at 285–90.
37. See supra notes 27–33 and accompanying text.
38. See Beyond Network Neutrality, supra note 3, at 67–68.
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vis-à-vis consumers exists because most Americans currently only have
two choices in last-mile broadband providers. Mandating network
neutrality would not alter that fact one iota. As a result, it would not reduce
the prices that cable modem and DSL charge consumers. That said,
network neutrality would affect the way that the resulting profits would be
divided between the Googles and the Verizons of the world. Although the
division of profits between network providers is crucial to those companies
and their shareholders, it is not ultimately a policy issue.
Wu:
Christopher’s last post does a good job of crystallizing the differences
between us on the last mile. In closing, let’s look at where we differ.
Christopher believes that, at least when it comes to information
networks, technology is changing the conditions for market entry in
physical networking. He points to fiber optics and the potential use of
wireless spectrum as examples. He believes that over the next decade we’re
likely to see vigorous competition among new entrants and old, like in any
other “regular” market.
At the risk of sounding like a dinosaur, I am skeptical. Despite the
mists and magic of the Internet, I don’t think the basic economics of
transportation infrastructure, and particularly telecom’s last mile, have
changed all that much. The time I actually spent in the industry made me
very skeptical of the kinds of claims about the technology Christopher has
made. And if I were investing in the market, I’d be willing to bet
Christopher that over the next decade the infrastructure market will
continue to heavily favor the main incumbents.
Instead of just speaking in the abstract, let’s look at a real example:
Verizon’s FiOS buildout. According to various figures, the costs are about
$1500 per home to lay fiber and then hook up a connection.39 That’s a lot
to have a chance of acquiring a customer who then may pay $50–$100 per
month in services. Those are also the costs of an incumbent carrier who
already has much of the infrastructure in place, not a true entrant. So if
you’re a competitive carrier, and say you have plans to reach 10 million
homes, we’re talking about a $10.5 billion capital investment—in other
words, serious money.
These facts are why, despite nearly a decade of talk, there are today
very few (in most markets, no) “facilities-based” competitors in the
residential market (other than the basic cable-Bell combination). Those that
haven’t gone out of business, companies like Yipes, target businesses
39. See, e.g., Stephanie N. Mehta, Verizon’s Big Bet on Fiber Optics, Fortune, Feb. 22,
2007, available at http://money.cnn.com/magazines/fortune/fortune_archive/2007/03/05/84
01289/index.htm.
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exclusively. The advantages of incumbency are great indeed.
In Verizon’s area, FiOS looks to be a great service at a great price
point, and I wouldn’t be surprised if it serves as a model for successful Bell
deployments. Meanwhile, cable has few tricks left for getting more
bandwidth out of its coaxial deployments, through adjusting how it uses the
bandwidth it already has.
What I am painting is essentially a rosy picture for the incumbents—
and why not? Comcast and other cable companies have grown strongly
through the 2000s, prompting Comcast’s CEO to say “2006 was simply our
40
best year ever… we could not be more enthusiastic about the future.”
AT&T, despite weaker facilities, remains healthy and profitable, even
41
before merging with Bell South. I don’t for a second begrudge the Bells
and cable companies their revenue and profits—I think they demonstrate
that the Internet economy has lifted all boats. I am in favor of doing
everything possible to make it easy for the Bells to offer TV service, and
for the cable companies to offer voice. Giving the Bells and cable more
ways to compete using private networks encourages the network buildouts
we’re reading about.
If I am right about where things are going, I think it leaves two last
policy questions. First, we ought to ask whether the buildouts we’ll see will
be fast or extensive enough. At some point, this is an issue of national
economic policy—what kind of broadband infrastructure does this country
really want?
Nothing in the current deployment plans are likely to make “ultra”
wideband reach marginal customers or nonwealthy areas. So as in other
areas of infrastructure policy, at some point we’re going to have to decide
whether we care if the nation’s ultra-broadband networks don’t reach the
whole population.
Second, and finally, we should consider what this means for network
neutrality. I think Christopher is right that in the big picture of last-mile
economics, net neutrality is chump change. But as I’ve said, net neutrality’s
prohibitions on discrimination are most important for favoring the lowestend market entrants—application companies. That’s why it’s been a wise
network design and why it makes for wise national policy.
In the end, network neutrality rules are not the only way government
can try to lower the costs of market entry in the national economy.
However, it is one of the simplest, and it has proven very effective over the
last decade. That’s why I favor whatever it takes—whether it’s just a code
40. Press Release, Comcast, Comcast Reports 2006 Results and Outlook for 2007 (Feb.
1, 2007), available at http://biz.yahoo.com/prnews/070201/phth005.html?. v=82.
41. AT&T, 2006 ANNUAL REPORT ONLINE (2007), http://www.att.com/Investor/ATT_
Annual /letter/index.html.
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of honor or an actual law—that keeps the network as neutral as possible as
between market competitors, and tries to keep the price of market entry as
low as possible.

